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Pursuing a PhD and postdoctoral training are major human capital investments involving 
several years of effort and substantial foregone earnings. As with earlier human capital 
investments, the benefits of these postgraduate investments lie in subsequent career 
opportunities. One such opportunity is the prospect of obtaining a tenure-track faculty position—
a job that comes with considerable nonmonetary attributes in terms of prestige, autonomy, and 
flexibility, if not with greater pay.  
However, becoming a tenure-track faculty member, particularly in the natural sciences in 
the United States, has become incredibly difficult. In 2016, approximately 2,700 students 
graduated with a PhD degree in chemistry, yet there were only 152 advertised openings for 
chemistry faculty positions in U.S. research-intensive universities.1 Only around 10 percent or 
fewer of PhDs who become tenure-track faculty are in chemistry and the life and biological 
sciences (Gaulé and Piacentini 2018; Sauermann and Roach 2016).  Yet, despite the low 
likelihood of ever becoming faculty, along with low postdoc salaries, many graduate students 
pursue one or multiple postdoctoral positions, often with the hopes that it will increase their 
chances to obtain academic employment (Hayter and Parker 2019).  
The fact that the number of chemistry PhD graduates vastly exceeds the number of 
faculty openings in many STEM fields has not escaped the attention of the science policy 
community and has been the subject of recurring debates (e.g., Alberts et al. 2014; Cyranoski et 
al. 2011; Freeman et al. 2001; Romer 2000; Sauermann and Roach 2016; Schillebeeckx, 
Maricque, and Lewis 2013).  
 
1 There are more than 200 research-intensive universities in the United States. Besides being relatively easy 
to measure, placements in research-intensive universities are precisely those that junior scholars aspiring to an 
academic career with a focus on research would target. The number of 152 openings is based on the results of a 
community effort to help applicants by identifying all relevant positions (see http://chemjobber.blogspot.com/). 
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Why do young scientists keep choosing to pursue PhD and postdoctoral training despite 
the dwindling academic career prospects? One possibility is that postdoctoral training improves 
nonacademic career prospects enough to be worthwhile even in the absence of academic career 
options.2 However, evidence suggests that nonacademic careers vary substantially in the extent 
that they require doctoral training (Hayter and Parker 2019). Alternatively, the experience of 
training itself may be appealing to graduate students, as scientists are drawn to the puzzle-
solving nature of doing science (Dasgupta and David 1994; Merton 1973; Sauermann and Roach 
2012; Stern 2004;). Meanwhile, for foreigners, visa considerations may steer individuals not just 
toward graduate study, but also toward postdoctoral training, as universities are not to subject to 
the same H1-B restrictions as private sector firms, which would allow them to more easily 
remain in the U.S. (Amuedo-Dorantes and Furtado 2019; Ganguli and Gaulé 2020; Stephan and 
Ma 2005). 
In this paper, we consider another factor that may contribute to observed human capital 
investment decisions: perhaps graduate students are not well informed about the state of the 
academic job market, and these incorrect beliefs play a role in their career decisions, particularly 
decisions to pursue postdoctoral training.3 Prior studies suggest through qualitative and survey 
evidence that individuals already in postdoc positions were indeed overly optimistic about the 
likelihood of getting an academic job, and that junior scientists who had already advanced 
beyond the PhD reported lacking information about nonacademic career options (Hayter and 
Parker 2019; Sauermann and Roach 2016).  Yet, it is unclear whether providing information 
 
2 For example, having completed postdoctoral training may have signaling or certification value on the 
labor market. Further, the knowledge gained through training may be applicable—and indeed highly valued—for 
working in industry (Aghion, Dewatripont, and Stein 2008; Dasgupta and David 1994; Sauermann and Roach 2016; 
Sauermann and Stephan 2010). 
3 Entering science involves a series of choices—from choosing a major in college to deciding to embark on 
a PhD and post-PhD career choices. Ideally, we would like to know how beliefs and information on the scientific 
labor market shape decisions to pursue a scientific career at an early stage.  
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about the academic market and nonacademic careers to chemistry PhD students prior to this 
would have a causal impact on their beliefs and subsequent career choices and preferences.  
In very different contexts, the economics literature has established that biased beliefs can 
drive human capital investment decisions and that providing information can causally impact 
subsequent educational choices (e.g., Dinkelman and Martinez 2014; Jensen 2010; Oreopoulos 
and Dunn 2013; Wiswall and Zafar 2015). In these studies, individuals typically underestimate 
the returns to education and thus underinvest in education or make suboptimal education choices. 
We focus on postgraduate human capital decisions and ask whether beliefs are biased and 
whether providing information about the academic and nonacademic labor markets can have a 
causal impact on subsequent education investments and career aspirations, in particular, 
preferences to pursue a postdoc and an academic career.  We focus on a sample of chemistry 
doctoral students at the top 54 U.S. chemistry departments using an original survey combined 
with a field experiment.4 In the baseline survey, we first elicit beliefs about the academic market 
and publishing in top journals, as well as career preferences for different types of postgraduation 
jobs, such as postdocs, industry, government, or teaching positions.  
At the end of the survey, a random subsample of respondents received a message with a 
link to a custom-built website providing information on actual historical placement records by 
institution in a tabular format (historical information treatment). This treatment provides 
structured information about the academic labor market.  Another random subsample received a 
message with a link to a webpage from the American Chemical Society (ACS), the main 
professional society for chemists, listing profiles with photos and career information about 
 
4 We focus on chemistry because it is a discipline that we are able to observe academic placements on a 
systematic and accurate basis, thanks to the availability of a faculty directory (the ACS directory of graduate 
research). No comparable data exists for biology or physics. However, tight academic labor markets and long 
postdoctoral training are prevalent across the life and hard sciences.  
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professional scientists in academic, industry, and government positions (role model treatment). 
This treatment provides less-structured information about both the academic and nonacademic 
labor markets, particularly through role models who work in nonacademic sectors, with whom 
students would have little exposure to during their studies. Such role model interventions through 
various media types have been shown to impact behavior in a variety of settings, including 
among STEM students (e.g., La Ferrara 2016; Porter and Serra 2020). 
The last randomly drawn subsample, the control group, did not receive any message. One 
year after the baseline survey, we conducted a follow-up survey with the respondents of the 
baseline survey. In order to track how beliefs changed over time and whether the information 
interventions caused differential adjustments in beliefs, we asked respondents the same questions 
about their expectations about the academic job market.  
Our first result is that at baseline, doctoral students in our sample are excessively 
optimistic, both about the state of the academic market in their field and about publishing in top 
journals. When we ask respondents to declare their beliefs about the share of peers from their 
program eventually obtaining a tenure-track position in a U.S. research-intensive university, only 
a third of respondents have beliefs in the correct range, with the rest being either mildly or 
widely overoptimistic. Being overly optimistic in turn correlates with stated preferences for 
doing a postdoc and academic careers more generally.   
Interestingly, respondents were more optimistic about their peers’ chances of obtaining a 
tenure-track position in a research-intensive university than about their own chances. Similar to 
Sauermann and Roach (2016), who show that graduate students in older cohorts are less likely to 
plan on doing a postdoc and are less interested in academic careers, we find that students further 
along in their programs are less likely to hold overoptimistic beliefs about their chances in the 
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academic job market. Foreign students were more likely to hold overoptimistic beliefs. Female 
students were more optimistic than male students about the prospects of their peers, but not about 
their own chances of becoming faculty.  
Turning to the experiment, we estimate the causal impact of each information 
intervention on beliefs and preferences for different careers one year later. We find that both 
types of information (historical information treatment and role model treatment) led to a 
downward adjustment in beliefs about respondents’ own chances of becoming faculty, 
particularly among those who had more optimistic initial beliefs.  Yet, we observe no significant 
impact of either type of information on beliefs about the share of graduates from their program 
eventually becoming faculty.   
We also examine impacts of the interventions on satisfaction with pursuing a PhD. We do 
not observe an effect of the historical information treatment on satisfaction with pursuing a PhD, 
but the role model treatment did lead to small decline in satisfaction.  Interestingly, we do find 
that the historical information treatment led to an increase in the perceived attractiveness of an 
academic career. To the extent that the historical placement information made respondents 
realize that becoming a faculty member is more difficult than they expected, this may have 
reinforced the perceived attractiveness of academic careers.  The role model treatment, 
meanwhile, increased the perceived attractiveness of government research and development 
positions and reduced the preference for doing a postdoc, suggesting that exposure to 
nonacademic career options can impact career preferences.  
We also examine longer-run outcomes by collecting data on actual placements for the 
subsample of chemistry students who completed their PhDs after the baseline survey two years 
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later.  For this sample, we do not see any significant effects in their actual career choices, 
including doing a postdoc after the PhD.  
In sum, we find that the beliefs of chemistry PhD students are often biased, and providing 
historically accurate information leads to an adjustment in beliefs, especially among those who 
initially had higher beliefs. Moreover, providing less structured information about nonacademic 
careers impacts preferences for these careers. Yet, these changes in beliefs lead to limited 
changes in career aspirations in the longer run, and we do not detect impacts on actual career 
outcomes. Taken together, these results provide further questions about the role of information in 
postgraduate human capital investments.  
There are several possible reasons for the limited estimated effects on stated career 
aspirations and actual outcomes.  First, it could be that other preferences known to drive 
scientists’ behavior (e.g., puzzle-solving nature of doing science or prestige) are already quite 
strong at this point in training, so that there was minimal impact of the information on actual 
career preferences and choices. Second, given the sequential nature of educational choices, and 
that these are individuals who are already far along in their training trajectory with little option 
value, switching costs may be high (Stange 2012).  Third, the experience of going through 
postdoctoral training may be enjoyable in itself or may be desirable for visa or dual-career 
considerations.  Finally, postdoctoral training is still valued in many industry and government 
positions. 
While we cannot differentiate between these explanations in the current study, our 
findings nonetheless suggest that there is a strong rationale for departments to provide better 
career information, about both academic and nonacademic careers, to prospective and actual 
students, and there seems to be demand for such information (Sauermann and Roach 2016). 
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Providing better information would ensure that the choices are made with full knowledge of what 
they imply, and the costs of collecting and sharing information on placements are low.  
In addition to these implications for the postgraduate labor market, this paper contributes 
to the growing literature on biased beliefs and overconfidence. The prevalence and implications 
of biased beliefs and overconfidence has been documented across many domains (Malmendier 
and Taylor 2015), such as labor supply (Mueller, Spinnewijn, and Topa 2018), the housing 
market (Armona, Fuster, and Zafar 2019), risky behavior (Dupas 2011), and returns to schooling 
(Bleemer and Zafar 2018; Loyalka et al. 2013; Wiswall and Zafar 2015). Notably, ours is the 
first study that investigates the existence of biased beliefs in the educational choice to pursue 
postgraduate studies, postdoctoral studies in particular, and estimates how these beliefs are 
impacted by the provision of objective information about the labor market. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section explains the institutional context. 
The third section describes the data and experimental design. The fourth section presents the 
results, and we end with the discussion in the final section. 
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT 
In this section, we discuss entry into scientific careers with a specific focus on chemistry 
and academic careers in the United States. The entry into scientific careers is characterized by 
long periods of training. A PhD degree typically takes six years and is often followed by one or 
several postdocs.5 The chemical and pharmaceutical industries, as well as the government, are 
major employers of chemistry PhD graduates, and graduates can enter into industry positions 
 
5 In the extreme case, a small but significant proportion of postdocs end up as “permadocs,” doing several 
subsequent postdoctoral trainings without ever advancing to another level (Powell 2015). 
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before or after postdoctoral training. Despite these human capital investments into becoming a 
professional researcher, many doctoral degree holders employed in industry do not actually 
conduct research in their jobs (Lautz et al. 2018). 
A necessary condition for becoming a tenure-track professor in chemistry at a research-
intensive U.S. university is earning a doctoral degree. However, in chemistry and other natural 
sciences, postdoctoral training has become de facto an additional prerequisite, with direct 
transitions from obtaining a PhD degree to a tenure-track position essentially unheard of. In other 
words, postdoctoral training is crucial for being competitive for faculty positions.  As a postdoc, 
junior scientists build their publication portfolios, apply for grants, and gain additional scientific 
and professional skills. Yet, the vast majority of postdocs do not become tenure-track faculty 
members. Around a third of chemistry graduate students pursue postdocs, but less than 10 
percent of graduating students are in a tenure-track position in a research-intensive U.S. 
university five years after graduation (Gaulé and Piacentini 2018). Such low odds have been 
documented in other disciplines and countries (Stephan 2012b).  
Postdocs receive comparatively low levels of compensation during their postdoctoral 
training. For example, postdocs receive on average a 31 percent lower hourly wage than an 
average U.S. worker regardless of the education level (Stephan 2013). The opportunity cost of 
choosing a three-year postdoc instead of working in industry was estimated to be around $60,000 
in 2012 (Stephan 2012a). Kahn and Ginther (2017) find that in biomedicine, compared with 
peers who started working outside academia immediately after finishing their graduate studies, 
those who finish a postdoc earn less when they actually start to work. They also find that 
postdocs forgo about one-fifth of their earnings potential in the first 15 years after finishing their 
doctorates, which amounts to more than $200,000.  
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While information on career prospects for scientists is often available from professional 
associations and other sources, departments generally provide relatively little career information 
to prospective and current graduate students. Prior to the launch of this study, we visited the 
websites of 56 chemistry departments in our sampling frame (see Appendix B) looking for their 
graduate degree holders’ placement information. For 70 percent of departments, we could find 
no placement information at all. The remainder typically provided examples of institutions that 
have hired their graduates or aggregate data on placement by broad industry categories. One 
notable exception was the Princeton chemistry department, which provided lists of graduates and 
their placements at the conclusion of PhD. See Appendix C for more details on placement 
information available from departmental websites.  
DATA AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
We combine two surveys of chemistry graduate students with a field experiment, linked 
to the data on individual publications and career choices. The surveys provide rich descriptive 
data on respondents’ beliefs and aspirations and how they evolve over time. To overcome 
potential hypothetical bias, we combine the data on hypothetical job preferences with real job 
preferences from hand-collected placement data of the survey respondents who finished their 
PhDs after the baseline survey. We also leverage data from faculty directories, PhD theses, and 
publications from an ongoing project on the production of knowledge in chemistry (see Catalini, 
Fons-Rosen, and Gaulé, forthcoming; Gaulé  2014; Gaulé  and Piacentini 2018). Our research 
design and data collection approach is summarized in Figure 1.  
Our analysis and intervention is based primarily on a survey we conducted in fall 2017 
(hereafter baseline survey) and a follow-up survey one-year later. To construct the sampling 
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frame, we first identified the set of 54 research-intensive U.S. universities that rank highest in the 
Academic Ranking of World Universities (Shanghai Ranking) in its chemistry subject ranking. 
These schools have large PhD programs, and their students are presumably comparatively better 
placed for the academic job market. We gathered the names and emails of all individuals 
(n=9,141) that were listed as graduate students in the chemistry departments of these universities, 
either on graduate student directory websites or on individual laboratory websites. We then sent 
them email invites to complete a survey using the Qualtrics online survey platform.6  
We received a total of 1,330 responses corresponding to a response rate of 15 percent.7  
The baseline survey included a set of basic demographic questions, as well as questions on 
undergraduate education, year of enrollment in the PhD program, progress in the PhD program, 
and field of specialization. We asked about career preferences using both standard Likert-scale 
measures and counterfactual choice questions. Regarding beliefs, we asked respondents to rate 
their chances of publishing in Nature, Science, or Cell—the most prestigious science journals—
to rate their chances of becoming a tenure-track faculty in a research-intensive university, and 
the share of students in their program they believe eventually become tenure-track faculty in a 
research-intensive university (see Appendix D for the exact survey questions). Finally, we asked 
respondents whether they would agree to be contacted in a follow up survey and if so to provide 
us with a permanent email address that we could use for future contact. Table A.1 in Appendix A 
shows means and standard deviations for several key variables from the baseline survey. 
 
6 To increase the response rate, we sent two reminder emails and offered a lottery with possibility of 
winning one of 10 Amazon gift certificates worth $100 each. The choice of using this type of lottery was informed 
by Sauermann and Roach (2013). 
7 One issue we encountered was that some of the individuals we contacted reported having already 
graduated, presumably reflecting the fact that some online directories and websites were not entirely up to date. We 
excluded such responses from our analysis sample. Adjusted for the presence of students who already graduated 
among the people we contacted, our response rate was around 18 percent.  
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We combined the baseline survey with an information provision experiment. After 
completing the baseline survey, respondents were randomly selected into either two treatment 
groups or one control group. Treatment groups received one of the two versions of a thank-you 
message via email with information related to the labor market, while the control group received 
no message at all.  
One of the messages contained more structured information (historical information 
treatment), which linked to a custom-built website providing information on historical actual 
academic placement rates by graduate institution in a tabular format.8 These placement rates 
were well below 10 percent for all institutions, so the information communicated was mainly an 
update on the difficulty of becoming a tenure-track faculty in a research department.  
The second message included less-structured information about nonacademic careers 
(role model treatment), which linked to a real webpage from the ACS called “Chemists in the 
Real World.”  This website features pictures with job titles and profiles of professional scientists 
in academic and (mostly) nonacademic positions (see Appendix F for the illustration of both 
websites used in this study).9 The role model treatment was intended to provide students with 
information about both the academic and nonacademic careers through role models. Such role 
model interventions through various modes, such as in person, websites, and television, have 
been shown to impact behavior in a variety of settings (e.g., Porter and Serra 2020; see La 
 
8 The historical placement records were based on previously collected data from Proquest Dissertations and 
Abstracts and the ACS directory of graduate research (Gaulé and Piacentini 2018). Specifically, we collected data 
on students graduating from U.S. chemistry graduate programs between 2008 and 2010 and matched their names to 
a 2015 list of chemistry faculty in research-intensive universities. We then computed the share of graduating 
students who had become faculty by 2015, by graduating department. For more details, see Appendix E. We 
published this data, together with a detailed explanation how the data was constructed on the custom-built website 
https://chemistryplacementdata.com/. The website was not advertised in any way. Web analytics confirm that the 
overwhelming majority of visits to the website originated from the survey emails. 
9 Available at https://www.acs.org/content/acs/en/careers/college-to-career/chemists.html (accessed August 
12, 2020). 
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Ferrara [2016]) by providing exposure to individuals with whom students otherwise would have 
little interaction in their studies.    
Not all respondents clicked on the links embedded in either message. While we did not 
track individual usage, we estimated that roughly 35 percent of survey respondents who received 
the link visited the custom-built website, versus around 1 percent of respondents in the control 
group (we could not track clicks to the ACS website; see Appendix G for details).  
The randomization procedure combined block randomization (stratified based on a 
department’s Shanghai Ranking) with individual-level randomization in a subset of universities 
(see Figure 1).10 In order to measure the impact of the intervention on respondents’ beliefs and 
plans, we contacted our respondents again roughly one year after the baseline survey and asked 
them to complete a follow-up survey.11 In the follow-up survey we repeated several questions 
from the baseline survey. We again incentivized responses by sending two reminder emails and 
offering a lottery to win a $100 Amazon gift certificate upon completing the survey. We obtained 
500 complete responses, roughly 38 percent of the initial survey respondents. Table A.2 in 
Appendix A reports means and standard deviations for several variables from the follow-up 
survey. We complemented the follow-up survey with hand-collected information on the current 
position of baseline survey respondents, such as whether they were doing a postdoc or working 
in industry (for descriptive statistics, see Table A.3 in Appendix A). This information was 
 
10 We created triads of departments of similar ranks, and within each triad assigned one department to the 
information treatment, one to the control, and one to individual randomization. Thus, one university of three in the 
block was randomly chosen as Treatment 1, so that all respondents to the baseline survey at this university received 
the first message with historical placement rate information. For the second university, respondents were in the 
control group. In the final university, survey respondents were individually randomized into one of the three groups 
(historical information, role model, or control). An advantage of this design is that for the historical information 
treatment, we have both individuals whose peers were also treated, and individuals whose peers were not treated. 
This randomization design was intended to enable us to measure potential spillovers from the treatment, if the 
treated individuals share information with their peers. However, sample size limitations prevent us from fully 
leveraging this aspect of the randomization. 
11 We excluded those who indicated in the first survey not to be contacted again.  
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collected in the summer of 2019, roughly two years after the baseline survey. We collected this 
information irrespective of whether individuals answered the second survey but only for students 
who were expecting to graduate in 2017, 2018, or 2019 at the time when they were filling in the 
baseline survey.  
Table A.4 shows differences in the characteristics of respondents to our follow-up survey 
to those who completed the baseline survey only. We see some differences in observable 
characteristics, as students from higher-ranked programs, foreign students, and students further 
along in the program were less likely to respond to the follow-up compared to those earlier in the 
program. We estimate all regressions including these controls. Importantly, we do not see 
differential attrition in the treatment group receiving the historical placement information 
treatment. We do see a small decline in the group receiving the role model treatment. However, 
for the actual outcomes collected, we have information for all baseline survey respondents, and 
therefore attrition is not a concern for those outcomes. 
RESULTS 
Prevalence of Biased Beliefs 
Do graduate students know how difficult it is to publish in the most prestigious scientific 
journals, and to become a tenure-track faculty member in a research-intensive university?  Are 
individuals overconfident about their own ability; in particular, do they overestimate their 
position in the ability distribution?  
One way we measure biased beliefs is by eliciting respondents’ beliefs about their 
chances of publishing as a first author in Nature, Science, or Cell before the end of their PhDs. 
When testing the survey, we had been warned that this is a very rare event. Indeed, only 1 in 200 
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chemistry PhD students reaches this milestone.12 A group of 1,301 students thus would be 
expected to collectively generate six or seven first-authored Nature, Science, or Cell 
publications. Yet, by aggregating the beliefs of the respondents, we find that they expect to 
collectively produce 310 first-authored Nature, Science, or Cell publications. Figure 2 plots the 
distribution of the respondents’ beliefs about their chances of publishing in Nature, Science, or 
Cell by the end of their PhD studies.  
We also asked respondents to rate their own chances of becoming a tenure-track faculty 
member in a research-intensive U.S. university. The distribution of those beliefs is displayed in 
Figure 3. In recent years, the share of chemistry PhD students becoming faculty members was 
around 5 percent. For instance, in 2016, a listing of chemistry faculty openings listed 152 tenure-
track positions in research-intensive U.S. universities, while 2,700 students graduated in this 
same year. Our own calculations, which are based on matching names from comprehensive lists 
of PhD graduates and faculty members in chemistry departments, suggest a similar rate. Again, 
the respondents collectively display optimistic beliefs although to a lesser degree than for 
Nature/Science/Cell publications. Specifically, if all the beliefs of the respondents were correct, 
320 students in our sample would become tenure-track faculty members in a research-intensive 
university, while only 66 of them would actually become faculty in chemistry departments based 
on historical averages. 
We also asked respondents about their peer beliefs—their beliefs about what share of 
PhD students in their programs would eventually become tenure-track faculty members. By 
asking about others in their program, we focus on information regarding the state of market. By 
 
12 Authors’ calculations based on chemistry PhD graduates listed in Proquest and Nature/Science/Cell 
bibliometric data. 
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contrast, the beliefs about their own chances to become faculty also incorporates beliefs about 
one’s own ability as well as preferences for the academic career.  
The distribution of beliefs about the share of peers becoming faculty in research-intensive 
universities is displayed in Figure 4. Interestingly, the mean beliefs about the share of students 
becoming faculty (24.5 percent) are actually slightly higher than the mean beliefs about their 
own chances to become faculty (24 percent).13 So, what looked like an above-average effect 
might be incorrect beliefs about the market as a whole. While there was some variation across 
programs, no program had a share higher than 10 percent in the historic placement data. Slightly 
less than 30 percent of the respondents answered between 0 and 10 percent, and thus essentially 
had correct beliefs about the state of the market. A further 25 percent of respondents were mildly 
optimistic, answering that between 11 percent and 20 percent of peers will become faculty. The 
remainder—45 percent of respondents—were wildly optimistic, with answers far above the 
observed average.  
In summary, these descriptive statistics suggest that overoptimistic beliefs about 
publishing and placement are widespread among graduate students. However, we also observe 
heterogeneity in beliefs, with some individuals having correct beliefs, and others being biased to 
various extents.  
Who holds optimistic beliefs? 
We now explore descriptively whether the heterogeneity in beliefs can be related to 
observable characteristics. For this, we regress each of the three types of beliefs on student 
 
13 As discussed earlier, both aggregate evidence and historical placement data suggest that this share is 
around 5 percent. 
 16 
gender, foreign status, time since enrollment in the program, and a dummy variable for top-10 
program (based on the Shanghai Ranking). 
Table 1 displays the results. Foreign students are considerably more optimistic about 
publishing and placement (Table 1, columns 1 and 2). Foreign students may be higher ability on 
average due to a tougher selection to get into U.S. PhD programs (Gaulé and Piacentini 2013). 
However, they also seem to be less informed about the tightness of the U.S. academic market 
(Table 1, column 3). Perhaps surprisingly, studying at a top-10 school is not associated with 
more optimistic beliefs. 
While the literature has documented gender differences in overconfidence (e.g., 
Murciano-Goroff 2019; Niederle and Vesterlund 2007), we notably find few gender differences 
in beliefs in our sample.  We find that female and male students are equally likely to hold 
optimistic beliefs about their chances to publish in Nature, Science, or Cell.  Female students are 
slightly more optimistic about the aggregate state of the academic market—that is, their peers’ 
chances of getting a tenure-track job (see Figures 5 and A.1)—but we observe no gender 
differences in beliefs about one’s own chances. 
Time since enrollment in the PhD program is a strong predictor of holding optimistic 
beliefs: students in their first or second year of study are the most optimistic, though there is no 
statistical difference between students in their third and subsequent years. The results are 
consistent with Stephan and Ma (2005); Sauermann and Roach (2012, 2016); Sauermann and 
Roach; and Gibbs, McGready, and Griffin (2015). 
We also investigate whether holding optimistic beliefs about the share of students 
becoming faculty is associated with preferences for academic careers (see Table 2). We measure 
these preferences by asking how likely respondents are to do a postdoc or to choose a prestigious 
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postdoc vs. an industry research job or a teaching position in a hypothetical choice question.14 
We find that respondents’ beliefs about the share of students becoming faculty is strongly 
correlated with preferences for continuing an academic path. This holds despite the fact that we 
are controlling for key observable correlates of holding optimistic beliefs, such as being a foreign 
student or being in the first or second year of study.  
As discussed earlier, in this discipline, moving straight from doctoral studies to tenure-
track positions is virtually impossible. However, by choosing postdoctoral training, a scientist 
keeps open the possibility of subsequently landing a tenure-track faculty position, a job that she 
often perceives to be highly desirable. The option to access this career path, while uncertain and 
risky, is part of the returns to doing a postdoc. Students who underestimate how difficult it is to 
obtain a tenure-track faculty position should thus be expected to find the postdoctoral option 
more attractive, which is exactly what we find.  
However, as in previous studies that have documented overoptimism among scientists 
(e.g., Sauermann and Roach 2016), these results are descriptive in nature. We cannot rule out 
that students who have optimistic or biased beliefs may also have other characteristics that drive 
preferences for doing a postdoc. It is thus unclear whether exogenously inducing updates in the 
beliefs could lead to changes in career preferences. The next section describes the results of the 
intervention where we provided information to a random sample of the baseline survey 
respondents, and then followed up with them one year later. 
 
14 See Appendix D for wording of question. 
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Effects of the Intervention 
Our experimental design combined block randomization at the university level with 
individual-level randomization for a subset of universities. Accordingly, survey respondents 
were assigned to one of the following five groups:15  
1) Treatment 1 (historical information treatment)—block randomization: Students 
received the email linking to the historical information on graduates’ placement, along with all 
other survey respondents from the same university receiving the same link. 
2) Control—block randomization: Students did not receive any email along with other 
survey respondents from the same university not receiving any email. 
3) Treatment 1 (historical information treatment)—individual randomization: Students 
received the email linking to the historical information on graduates’ placement along with only 
some of respondents from the same university receiving the same link. 
4) Treatment 2 (role model treatment)—individual randomization: Students received the 
email linking to the ACS profiles website along with only some respondents from the same 
university receiving the same link.  
5) Control (some peers treated)—individual randomization: Students did not receive an 
email but some other survey respondents from the same university received the other types of 
emails (Treatment 1 and 2). 
We use the second group—those who did not receive any email with other survey 
respondents from the same university not receiving any email—as the control group and the 
 
15 Alternatively, we could pool treatment 1, block randomization, and treatment 1, individual 
randomization, into a single variable. Results from the alternative specification are presented in Table A.5. The 
results are qualitatively similar with this alternative specification except for the changes of the beliefs of own 
chances to become faculty, where the effect of the historical placement intervention is just outside the significance 
region (p-value-0.11 instead of 0.02 in the preferred specification) but the effect of the ACS profiles intervention is 
significant.  
 19 
omitted category in all specifications.16 Our variables of interest are indicator variables for each 
of the other categories, or treatments, and we present specifications both with and without 
controls. 
We first consider the effect of the intervention on beliefs using the sample of students 
who answered both the initial and final survey one year later. As in the descriptive analysis, we 
observe two types of beliefs: the beliefs about peers (which share of students in their program 
become faculty) and the self-beliefs (own chances of becoming faculty). Since we asked the 
exact same questions on beliefs in the initial and final surveys, we can track the evolution of 
beliefs over time and whether they were impacted by the treatment.  
Tables 3 and 4 show the effect of the intervention on the changes in beliefs between the 
two surveys (final minus initial beliefs). Note that the mean change in either type of beliefs is 
negative, suggesting that students become more pessimistic over time. The point estimates for 
the effect of all treatments on beliefs about the share of peers becoming faculty are small and 
statistically insignificant. However, both the block-randomized historical placement information 
treatment and the role model treatment had a statistically significant effect on the changes in 
beliefs of own chances of becoming faculty, where receiving the information lowered beliefs 
about one’s own changes of getting a tenure-track faculty position (see Table 4). The magnitude 
of the effect is similar in magnitude to the mean of the dependent variable, suggesting that 
individuals who received the information became less optimistic about their chances to become 
faculty members at a faster rate than those who did not. The coefficients on both the individually 
randomized historical information treatment and the “Some peers treated” group are smaller in 
magnitude than for the block-randomized historical information treatment. This is consistent 
 
16 We also estimate the treatment effects of the historical placement information when pooling the block-
randomized and individually randomized groups. See Table A.5. 
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with the effects of the historical placement information being amplified when all peers received 
the information, rather than only a small subset of individuals, likely by creating more 
opportunities for discussions that made the information more salient. 
It is puzzling that we find an effect of both types of information interventions on self-
beliefs but not on beliefs about peers. Prior to the intervention, we had expected that the 
intervention might impact both types of beliefs and that, if anything, the effect might be weaker 
for the beliefs of one’s own chances.  
We next examine whether there was differential response to the treatments in who 
updated their beliefs. Figure 6 shows that those with higher initial self-beliefs (those who are 
most optimistic regarding their own chances of becoming faculty) were more likely to update 
their beliefs in response to the historical information treatment. Table A.6 shows that for both 
information treatments, the higher the baseline beliefs, the greater the decline in subsequent 
beliefs. In Table A.7, we estimate heterogeneity in response to the treatment by our main 
covariates: gender, foreign status, and a dummy variable for a top-20 program.  Here we see that 
there are not many significant differences, apart from a larger negative effect of both treatments 
on the beliefs about peers among foreign students.   
Now that we have established that the information treatment did impact beliefs about 
one’s own chances of becoming faculty, we proceed to investigate whether the information 
interventions impacted career preferences and actual career choices. For the latter, we can also 
include baseline survey respondents who did not complete the final survey, as we code career 
choices using publicly available information. Given that the historical placement information 
intervention led to a downward adjustment in the beliefs of their own chances of becoming 
faculty, we would expect postdocs to become less desirable in the treatment group (relative to the 
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controls), and fewer people actually choosing postdocs. However, as Tables 5 and 6 show, we 
find no effect of the historical placement information intervention on preferences for doing a 
postdoc or actually taking up a postdoc position after graduation.17  
As for the role model intervention, we see a negative effect on the propensity to choose 
the postdoc option in the counterfactual choice option, consistent with the role model 
intervention making nonacademic careers more salient and attractive. However, we do not find 
an effect on actual career outcomes. 
Finally, we consider the effect of the interventions on additional outcomes: satisfaction 
with the PhD as a career choice and perceived attractiveness of a faculty position and a 
government research and development position. Surprisingly, we do not see an effect of either 
intervention on satisfaction with pursuing a PhD as a career choice (Table 6). However, the 
historical placement information did significantly increase the perceived attractiveness of an 
academic faculty position (Table 7A). To the extent that the historical placement information 
made respondents realize that becoming a faculty member is more difficult than they expected, 
this may have counterintuitively reinforced the perceived attractiveness of academic careers. The 
role model treatment meanwhile increased the perceived attractiveness of a government research 
and development position (Table 7B). The ACS profiles page lists individuals in government 
research positions, so this suggests that exposure to these profiles provided information that 
students previously were not exposed to about government careers, which made them more 
attractive as potential careers.  
 
17 This finding echoes Sauermann and Roach (2016), who find in a descriptive analysis no systematic 
evidence of a relationship between perceived demand for jobs in academia and the choice of postdoctoral training. 
 22 
DISCUSSION 
This paper studies the beliefs of science PhD students regarding the academic job market 
and how these beliefs impact their preferences for different types of careers and their decisions 
upon graduating. It uses a novel survey of chemistry graduate students combined with the 
randomized information interventions.  
We find considerable evidence that graduate students are excessively optimistic regarding 
the state of academic job market, their chances to become faculty, and their chances to publish in 
the very best scientific journals. Students early in the program, as well as foreign students, are 
more likely to hold excessively optimistic beliefs. Holding such beliefs is in turn associated with 
intentions to engage in postdoctoral training after the PhD.   
Providing information on historical placement rates and nonacademic career options 
through role models appears to influence beliefs one year later, with treated individuals adjusting 
their perceived chances of becoming faculty members. We find evidence that the historical 
information treatment led to an increase in the perceived attractiveness of faculty positions, while 
the role model treatment increased the perceived attractiveness of government R&D positions 
and reduced the preference for doing a postdoc. However, we do not observe effects on 
satisfaction with choosing the PhD as a career choice, nor do we see an effect of the 
interventions on actual career choices two years after the PhD (for a subsample of respondents 
who had graduated). 
Taken together, these results provide further questions about the role of information in 
postgraduate human capital investments. On the one hand, the beliefs of graduate students are 
often biased, and providing historically accurate information leads to an adjustment in beliefs, 
especially among those who initially had higher beliefs. On the other hand, the change in beliefs 
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we induced experimentally lead to limited changes in career preferences and aspirations, and we 
do not detect impacts on actual career outcomes.  
There are several possible reasons for the limited effects on stated career aspirations and 
actual outcomes.  First, for various reasons, preferences for postdoctoral training may be quite 
strong among this group.  For example, it could be that other preferences known to drive 
scientists’ behavior (e.g., prestige or the puzzle-solving nature of practicing science) are already 
quite strong at this point in training, so there was minimal impact of the information on actual 
career preferences and choices. Moreover, given the sequential nature of educational choices, 
and that these are individuals who are already far along in their training trajectory, switching 
costs may be high. Additionally, the experience of going through postdoctoral training may be 
enjoyable in itself or may be desirable for visa or dual-career considerations. Finally, 
postdoctoral training is still valued in many industry and government positions. 
Another reason may be due to the types of information we provided. Perhaps a stronger 
intervention impacting beliefs more soundly would lead to observable changes in actions. Only a 
minority of individuals who received the link to the historical information treatment actually 
acquired the information. Given the effects of the role model treatment, information provided 
directly by the ACS or the students’ own department would give the information more 
credibility. Additionally, our sample size was relatively limited, and having more statistical 
power would have allowed us to test for further heterogeneity in which types of students 
responded more or less to the information. 
While we cannot differentiate between these explanations in the current study, our 
findings nonetheless suggest that there is a strong rationale for departments to provide better 
 24 





Aghion, Phillipe, M. Dewatripont, and J.C. Stein. 2008. “Academic Freedom, Private‐Sector 
Focus, and the Process of Innovation.” RAND Journal of Economics 39(3): 617–635. 
Alberts, B., M.W. Kirschner, S. Tilghman, and H. Varmus. 2014. “Rescuing US Biomedical 
Research from Its Systemic Flaws.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 
111(16): 5773–5777. 
Amuedo-Dorantes, C., and D. Furtado. 2019. “Settling for Academia? H-1B Visas and the 
Career Choices of International Students in the United States.” Journal of Human 
Resources 54(2): 401–429. 
Armona, L., A. Fuster, and B. Zafar. 2019. “Home Price Expectations and Behavior: Evidence 
from a Randomized Information Experiment.” Review of Economic Studies 86(4): 1371–
1410. 
Bleemer, Z., and B. Zafar. 2018. “Intended College Attendance: Evidence from an Experiment 
on College Returns and Costs.” Journal of Public Economics 157: 184–211. 
Catalini, C., C. Fons-Rosen, and P. Gaulé. Forthcoming. “How Do Travel Costs Shape 
Collaboration?” Management Science. 
Cyranoski, D., N. Gilbert, H. Ledford, A. Nayar, and M. Yahia. 2011. “Education: The PhD 
Factory.” Nature News 472(7343): 276–279. 
 25 
Dasgupta, P., and P.A. David. 1994. “Toward a New Economics of Science.” Research Policy 
23(5): 487–521. 
Dinkelman, T., and A.C. Martínez. 2014. “Investing in Schooling in Chile: The Role of 
Information about Financial Aid for Higher Education.” Review of Economics and 
Statistics 96(2): 244–257. 
Dupas, P. 2011. “Do Teenagers Respond to HIV Risk Information? Evidence from a Field 
Experiment in Kenya.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3(1):1–36 
Freeman, R., E. Weinstein, E. Marincola, J. Rosenbaum, and F. Solomon. 2001. “Competition 
and Careers in Biosciences.” Science 294(5550): 2293–2294 
Ganguli, I., and P. Gaulé. 2020. “Will the US Keep the Best and the Brightest (as Post-docs)? 
Career and Location Preferences of Foreign STEM PhDs.” In The Role of Immigrants 
and Foreign Students in Science, Innovation, and Entrepreneurship, Ina Ganguli, 
Shulamit Kahn, and Megan MacGarvie, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 
49–71. 
Gaulé, P., 2014. “Who Comes Back and When? Return Migration Decisions of Academic 
Scientists.” Economics Letters 124(3): 461–464 
Gaulé, P., and M. Piacentini. 2013. “Chinese Graduate Students and US Scientific Productivity.” 
Review of Economics and Statistics 95(2): 698–701. 
———. 2018. “An Advisor Like Me? Advisor Gender and Post-Graduate Careers in Science.” 
Research Policy 47(4): 805–813. 
Hayter, C.S., and M.A. Parker. 2019. “Factors That Influence the Transition of University 
Postdocs to Non-Academic Scientific Careers: An Exploratory Study.” Research Policy 
48(3): 556–570. 
 26 
Jensen, R. 2010. “The (Perceived) Returns to Education and the Demand for Schooling.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 125(2): 515–548. 
Kahn, S., and D.K. Ginther. 2017. “The Impact of Postdoctoral Training on Early Careers in 
Biomedicine.” Nature Biotechnology 35(1): 90. 
La Ferrara, E., 2016. “Mass Media and Social Change: Can We Use Television to Fight 
Poverty?” Journal of the European Economic Association 14(4): 791–827. 
Lautz, L.K., D.H. McCay, C.T. Driscoll, R L. Glas, K.M. Gutchess, A.J. Johnson, and G.D. 
Millard. 2018. “Preparing Graduate Students for STEM Careers Outside Academia.” Eos, 
https://doi.org/10.1029/2018EO101599 (accessed August 13, 2020).  
Loyalka, P., C. Liu, Y. Song, H. Yi, X. Huang, J. Wei, L. Zhang, Y. Shi, J. Chu, and S. Rozelle. 
2013. “Can Information and Counseling Help Students from Poor Rural Areas Go to 
High School? Evidence from China.” Journal of Comparative Economics 41(4): 1012–
1025. 
Malmendier, U., and T. Taylor. 2015. “On the Verges of Overconfidence.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 29(4): 3–8. 
Merton, R.K. 1973. The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Mueller, A.I., J. Spinnewijn, and G. Topa. 2018. Job Seekers’ Perceptions and Employment 
Prospects: Heterogeneity, Duration Dependence and Bias. NBER Working Paper No 
25294. Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Murciano-Goroff, R. 2019. “Missing Women in Tech: The Labor Market for Highly Skilled 
Software Engineers.” New York: New York University. 
 27 
Niederle, M., and L. Vesterlund. 2007. “Do Women Shy Away from Competition? Do Men 
Compete Too Much?” Quarterly Journal of Economics 122(3): 1067–1101. 
https://doi.org/10.1162/qjec.122.3.1067 (accessed August 13, 2020). 
Oreopoulos, P., and R. Dunn. 2013. “Information and College Access: Evidence from a 
Randomized Field Experiment.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics 115(1): 3–26. 
Porter, C. and D. Serra. 2020. “Gender Differences in the Choice of Major: The Importance of 
Female Role Models.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 12(3): 226–254. 
Powell, K. 2015. “The Future of the Postdoc.” Nature 520(7546): 144–147. 
Romer, P. M. 2000. “Should the Government Subsidize Supply or Demand in the Market for 
Scientists and Engineers?” Innovation Policy and the Economy 1: 221–252. 
Sauermann, H., and M. Roach. 2012. “Science PhD Career Preferences: Levels, Changes, and 
Advisor Encouragement.” PloS One 7(5): e36307. 
———. 2013. Increasing Web Survey Response Rates in Innovation Research: An Experimental 
Study of Static and Dynamic Contact Design Features. Research Policy 42(1): 273‒86. 
———. 2016. “Why Pursue the Postdoc Path?” Science 352(6286): 663–664. 
Sauermann, H., and P.E. Stephan. 2010. “Twins or Strangers? Differences and Similarities 
between Industrial and Academic Science.” NBER Working Paper No. 16113. 
Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Schillebeeckx, M., B. Maricque, and C. Lewis. 2013. “The Missing Piece to Changing the 
University Culture.” Nature Biotechnology 31(10): 938. 
Stange, K.M., 2012. “An Empirical Investigation of the Option Value of College Enrollment.” 
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 4(1): 49–84. 
Stephan, P. 2012a. “Research Efficiency: Perverse Incentives.” Nature 484(7392): 29. 
 28 
———. 2012b. How Economics Shapes Science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
———. 2013. “How to Exploit Postdocs.” BioScience 63(4): 245–246. 
Stern, S. 2004. “Do Scientists Pay to be Scientists?” Management Science 50(6): 835–853. 
Wiswall, M., and B. Zafar. 2015. “How Do College Students Respond to Public Information 


































0 20 40 60 80 100
Respondents' beliefs about their own chance to become faculty
 32 













0 20 40 60 80 100
Respondents' beliefs - share of PhDs from own program getting U.S. TT positions
 33 
Figure 5  Beliefs of Own Chances and Peers’ Chances, by Gender 
 
 










Table 1  Who Holds Overoptimistic Beliefs? 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 D.V.= Respondents’ beliefs 
 Own chances to publish in 
Nature/Science/Cell 
Own chances to become 
faculty 
Percentage of students 
becoming faculty 
Female 0.359 −1.155 2.396** 
 (1.616) (1.380) (0.971) 
    
Foreign student 9.400*** 8.343*** 3.798*** 
 (1.914) (1.587) (1.120) 
    
Top-10 school −1.897 −2.625 −1.349 
 (1.969) (1.679) (1.181) 
    
First-year student 17.753*** 9.789*** 7.355*** 
 (2.233) (1.890) (1.331) 
    
Second-year student 9.512*** 6.713*** 4.558*** 
 (2.152) (1.829) (1.287) 
    
Third-year student 0.767 1.522 1.414 
 (2.200) (1.874) (1.319) 
    
Obs. 1,301 1,333 1,330 
Mean of D.V. 24.907 23.953 24.472 
R2 0.073 0.048 0.039 
NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variables are the respondents’ beliefs regarding (1) their chances to publish 
in Nature, Science, or Cell as a first author by the end of their PhD, (2) their chances to become tenure-track faculty in a research-
intensive U.S. university, and (3) the percentage of students becoming become tenure-track faculty in a research-intensive U.S. 
university. All the beliefs are expressed on a scale from 0 to 100. The omitted category for time in the program is fourth year and 
above. Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 2  Optimistic Beliefs and Preferences for Academia 
 (1) (2) 
 D.V.= Likelihood of doing a 
postdoc 
D.V.= Choosing postdoc among 
three options 






   
Female −2.102 −2.559* 
 (1.743) (1.350) 
   
Foreign student 12.085*** 10.575*** 
 (2.012) (1.586) 
   
Top-10 school −1.219 1.747 
 (2.139) (1.640) 
   
First-year student 6.000** 5.779*** 
 (2.401) (1.878) 
   
Second-year student 3.566 3.599** 
 (2.298) (1.801) 
   
Third-year student 1.897 −1.419 
 (2.383) (1.832) 
Obs. 1,271 1,312 
Mean of D.V. 54.155 25.524 
R2 0.055 0.056 
NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The dependent variables are (1) the likelihood of doing a postdoc as reported in the 
baseline survey (percentage out of one hundred), and (2) the likelihood (out of 100) of choosing the postdoc when offered a 
counterfactual choice between a postdoc, research position in industry, or a teaching position (see Appendix D). The variable of 
interest is the respondents’ beliefs of the share of students becoming faculty (also out of 100). The omitted category for time in the 




Table 3  Effect of the Interventions on Beliefs Regarding the Share of Students Becoming 
Faculty 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 D.V.= Change in beliefs of the 
share of students becoming faculty 








    
Role model treatment 0.938 0.373 0.263 
 (2.182) (2.583) (2.052) 
    
Historical placement info treatment 
(individual) 
1.184 1.000 0.154 
(2.346) (2.469) (2.343) 
    
Some peers treated  1.004 0.239 −0.630 
 (2.249) (2.416) (1.867) 
Obs. 500 500 500 
Controls None Demographics, field Demographics,  
field + Initial beliefs 
Mean of D.V. −3.520 −3.520 −3.520 
R2 0.001 0.081 0.374 
NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. These regressions are run on the sample of survey respondents who answered both, the 
initial and follow-up survey. The dependent variable is the change in beliefs of the percentage of students who will become faculty 
(belief in the final survey minus belief in the initial survey). The coefficients reported correspond to four different indicators for 
each treatment status (see main text for description). The omitted group is the group of survey respondents who did not receive a 
thank-you message in universities where other respondents also did not receive a thank-you message. The specification (1) does 
not include any controls. Specification (2) includes controls for gender, foreign status, field of study, time in the program, and 
university rank. In specification (3) we additionally control for the initial level of beliefs. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. 




Table 4  Effect of the Interventions on Beliefs Regarding Own Chances to Become Faculty 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 D.V.= Changes in beliefs of own chances to become faculty 








    
Role model treatment −5.083* −6.888** −5.982** 
 (2.624) (2.655) (2.213) 
    
Historical placement info treatment 
(individual) 
−2.882 −3.194 −2.015 
(2.402) (2.559) (2.959) 
    
Some peers treated −2.144 −3.540 −2.689 
 (2.743) (2.957) (2.787) 
Obs. 500 500 500 
Mean of D.V. −3.736 −3.736 −3.736 
R2 0.015 0.092 0.273 
NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. These regressions are run on the sample of survey respondents who answered both the 
initial and follow-up survey. The dependent variable is the change in beliefs of the respondents’ own chances to become faculty 
(belief in the final survey minus belief in the initial survey). The coefficients reported correspond to 4 different indicators for each 
treatment status (see main text for description). The omitted group is the survey respondents who did not receive a thank-you 
message in universities where other respondents also did not receive a thank-you message. Specification (1) does not include any 
controls. Specification (2) includes controls for gender, foreign status, field of study, time in the program and university rank. In 
specification (3) we additionally control for the initial level of beliefs. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The cluster is a 
group of three universities of similar rank which was used to stratify the block randomization. 
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Table 5  Effect of the Interventions on Post-PhD Career Choice 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 D.V.= Started a postdoc after PhD 








    
Role model treatment −0.066 −0.032 −0.026 
 (0.045) (0.042) (0.041) 
    








    
Some peers treated −0.043 −0.007 0.008 
 (0.048) (0.053) (0.057) 
Obs. 574 574 574 
Mean of D.V. 0.181 0.181 0.181 
R2 0.006 0.118 0.231 
NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. These regressions are run on the sample of survey respondents who as of September 
2017 were expecting to graduate in 2017, 2018 and 2019, irrespective of whether they answered the final survey afterwards. The 
dependent variable is whether the person actually started a postdoc as determined by manual searches. The coefficients reported 
correspond to 4 different indicators for each treatment status (see main text for description). The omitted group is the survey 
respondents who did not receive a thank-you message in universities where other respondents also did not receive a thank-you 
message. The specification (1) does not include any controls. The specification (2) includes controls for gender, foreign status, field 
of study, time in the program, and university rank. In specification (3) we additionally control for the initial level of beliefs. 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The cluster is a group of three universities of similar rank which was used to stratify the 
block randomization.  
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Table 6  Effect of the Interventions on Satisfaction with the PhD as a Career Choice 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 D.V.= Changes in satisfaction with the PhD as a career choice 








    
Role model treatment −0.648 −0.774 −0.814* 
 (0.374) (0.455) (0.442) 
    
Historical placement info 







    
Some peers treated 0.714** 0.410 0.351 
 (0.333) (0.326) (0.288) 
N 496 496 496 
Mean of D.V. 2.613 2.613 2.613 
R2 0.016 0.084 0.106 
NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. These regressions are run on the sample of survey respondents who answered both the 
initial and follow-up survey. The dependent variable is the change in respondents’ satisfaction with choosing a PhD as career track. 
The coefficients reported correspond to four different indicators for each treatment status (see main text for description). The 
omitted group is the survey respondents who did not receive a thank-you message in universities where other respondents also did 
not receive a thank-you message. The specification (1) does not include any controls. The specification (2) includes controls for 
gender, foreign status, field of study, time in the program, and university rank. In specification (3) we additionally control for the 
initial level of beliefs. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The cluster is a group of three universities of similar rank which 
was used to stratify the block randomization.  
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Table 7A  Effect of the Interventions on Perceived Attractiveness of Faculty Position 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 D.V.= Changes in the attractiveness of faculty positions 








    
Role model treatment 0.102 0.129 0.132 
 (0.166) (0.181) (0.188) 
    








    
Some peers treated 0.081 0.151 0.154 
 (0.190) (0.204) (0.210) 
N 500 500 500 
Mean of D.V. −0.288 −0.288 −0.288 
R2 0.009 0.089 0.096 
 
 
Table 7B  Effect of the interventions on perceived attractiveness of gov’t R&D position 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 D.V.= Changes in the attractiveness of gov’t R&D positions 








    
Role model treatment 0.184 0.259* 0.272** 
 (0.119) (0.128) (0.128) 
    








    
Some peers treated 0.168 0.170 0.191 
 (0.136) (0.153) (0.159) 
N 500 500 500 
Mean of D.V. −0.084 −0.084 −0.084 
R2 0.006 0.056 0.076 
NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. These regressions are run on the sample of survey respondents who answered both the 
initial and follow-up survey. The dependent variable is the change in perceived attractiveness of faculty positions for Panel A and 
of government R&D positions for Panel B (reported attractiveness in the final survey minus reported attractiveness in the initial 
survey). Attractiveness is measured on a 1–5 scale. The coefficients reported correspond to four different indicators for each 
treatment status (see main text for description). The omitted group is the survey respondents who did not receive a thank-you 
message in universities where other respondents also did not receive a thank-you message. The specification (1) does not include 
any controls. The specification (2) includes controls for gender, foreign status, field of study, time in the program, and university 
rank. In specification (3) we additionally control for the initial level of beliefs. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The cluster 




Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics and Covariate Balance 
 
Table A1  Descriptive Statistics on Baseline Survey Respondents (n=1,330) 
   
 Mean S.D. 
Chances of publishing in Nature/Science/Cell 24.91 29.90 
Chances of becoming TT faculty in a U.S. research- intensive university 24.47 17.76 
Share of students becoming faculty in U.S. research-intensive university 23.95 25.38 
Likelihood of doing a postdoc 54.13 31.32 
Likelihood of choosing postdoc among three options 25.52 24.75 
Female 0.42 0.49 
Foreign 0.28 0.45 
Top-10 school 0.20 0.40 
Year in doctoral program   
   First year 0.19 0.39 
   Second year 0.21 0.40 
   Third year 0.19 0.40 
Field of study   
   Analytical chemistry 0.11 0.32 
   Biological/biochemistry 0.18 0.38 
   Inorganic chemistry 0.16 0.37 
   Medical/clinical/pharmaceutical chemistry 0.01 0.12 
   Organic chemistry 0.18 0.38 
   Physical chemistry 0.16 0.36 
   Polymer chemistry 0.04 0.20 
   Theoretical/computational chemistry 0.07 0.25 
   Other 0.09 0.28 




Table A2  Descriptive Statistics on final survey respondents (n=500) 
   
 Mean S.D. 
Change in beliefs of the share of students becoming faculty −3.52 15.70 
Changes in beliefs of own chances to become faculty −3.74 20.28 
Historical placement info treatment (block) 0.31 0.46 
Role model treatment 0.12 0.33 
Historical placement info treatment (individual) 0.12 0.33 
Some peers treated 0.12 0.33 
Female 0.47 0.50 
Foreign 0.17 0.38 
Top-10 school 0.25 0.43 
Year in doctoral program   
   First year 0.21 0.40 
   Second year 0.28 0.45 
   Third year 0.22 0.41 
Field of study   
   Analytical chemistry 0.11 0.32 
   Biological/biochemistry 0.17 0.38 
   Inorganic chemistry 0.17 0.37 
   Medical/clinical/pharmaceutical chemistry 0.01 0.12 
   Organic chemistry 0.17 0.38 
   Physical chemistry 0.17 0.38 
   Polymer chemistry 0.04 0.20 
   Theoretical/computational chemistry 0.07 0.26 
   Other 0.07 0.26 
      




Table A3  Descriptive Statistics on Sample with Actual Placement Data (n=574) 
   
 Mean S.D. 
Started a postdoc 0.18 0.39 
Change in beliefs of the share of students becoming faculty 0.29 0.45 
Changes in beliefs of own chances to become faculty 0.16 0.36 
Historical placement info treatment (block) 0.12 0.32 
Role model treatment 0.13 0.34 
Female 0.44 0.50 
Foreign 0.26 0.44 
Top-10 school 0.20 0.40 
Year in doctoral program   
   First year 0.01 0.10 
   Second year 0.04 0.20 
   Third year 0.38 0.49 
Field of study   
   Analytical chemistry 0.11 0.32 
   Biological/biochemistry 0.17 0.38 
   Inorganic chemistry 0.18 0.38 
   Medical/clinical/pharmaceutical chemistry 0.02 0.12 
   Organic chemistry 0.17 0.38 
   Physical chemistry 0.14 0.35 
   Polymer chemistry 0.06 0.23 
   Theoretical/computational chemistry 0.07 0.25 
   Other 0.08 0.27 




Table A4  Is There Differential Selection into the Follow-up Survey? 
 (1)  
 Responded follow-up survey 
Historical placement info treatment (block) −0.044 (0.034) 
Role model treatment −0.094** (0.042) 
Historical placement info treatment (individual) −0.044 (0.045) 
Some peers treated −0.058 (0.044) 
Foreign student −0.147*** (0.031) 
Female 0.022 (0.027) 
Top-10 school  0.091*** (0.033) 
First-year student 0.127*** (0.036) 
Second-year student 0.194*** (0.035) 
Third-year student 0.128*** (0.036) 
Field study   
   Analytical chemistry 0.020 (0.050) 
   Biological/biochemistry 0.006 (0.044) 
   Inorganic chemistry 0.007 (0.044) 
   Medical/clinical/pharmaceutical chemistry 0.022 (0.113) 
   Physical chemistry 0.044 (0.045) 
   Polymer chemistry −0.012 (0.070) 
   Theoretical/computational chemistry 0.043 (0.058) 
   Other −0.042 (0.054) 
Constant 0.322*** (0.043) 
Obs. 1,330  
Mean of D.V. 0.375  
NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
Organic chemistry excluded.  
Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table A5  Effects of the Interventions Pooling the Historical Placement Info Treatment into 
One Variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Change in beliefs 




beliefs of own 
chances to 
become faculty 




the PhD as a 
career choice 
Changes in the 
attractiveness of 
faculty positions 
Historical placement info 












      
Role model 0.254 −6.012** −0.025 −0.710 0.133 
treatment (2.045) (2.194) (0.041) (0.410) (0.184) 
      
Some peers treated  −0.640 −2.712 0.009 0.333 0.145 
 (1.862) (2.750) 0.056 (0.248) (0.189) 
Obs. 500 500 574 496 500 
Controls Demographics, 
field + Initial 
beliefs 
Demographics, 
field + Initial 
beliefs 
Demographics, 
field + Initial 
beliefs 
Demographics, 
field + Initial 
beliefs 
Demographics, 
field + Initial 
beliefs 
Mean of D.V. −3.520 −3.736 0.181 2.613 −0.288 
R2 0.374 0.273 0.230 0.171 0.129 
NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. These regressions correspond to the column of tables 3–7 except that historical placement 
info treatment (block) and historical placement info treatment (individual) are pooled instead of being entered separately. The 
omitted group is the group of survey respondents who did not receive a thank-you message in universities where other respondents 
also did not receive a thank-you message. All specification control for gender, foreign status, time in the program, university rank, 
and the initial level of beliefs. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The cluster is a group of three universities of similar rank, 






Table A6  Heterogeneity: Effects of the Interventions on Peer and Own Beliefs by Baseline 
Beliefs 
 (1) (2) 
 Change in beliefs of the share of 
students becoming faculty 
Changes in beliefs of own chances 
to become faculty 
Historical placement info treatment (block) 3.498 −0.049 
(3.075) (2.092) 
   
Role model treatment −2.419 −0.781 
 (2.805) (2.650) 
   




   
Some peers treated 6.758** −3.037 
 (2.823) (2.838) 
   




   
Role model treatment × Baseline beliefs 0.117 −0.233** 
(0.118) (0.089) 
   
Historical placement info treatment 
(individual) × Baseline beliefs 
−0.205 0.028 
(0.170) (0.072) 
   
Some peers treated × Baseline beliefs −0.272* 0.023 
(0.146) (0.114) 
   
N 500 500 
Mean of D.V. −3.520 −3.736 
R2 0.351 0.263 
NOTE: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All specification control for gender, foreign status, time in the program, university rank 
and the initial level of beliefs. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The cluster is a group of three universities of similar rank 




Table A7  Heterogeneity: Effects of the Interventions on Peer and Own Beliefs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Change in beliefs of the share of students becoming 
faculty 
Changes in beliefs of own chances to become faculty 
Covariate  Female Foreign Top Univ. Female Foreign Top Univ. 
Historical placement info treatment (block) 0.951 2.127 1.796 −7.061*** −4.784** −1.857 
(1.967) (1.409) (3.872) (1.438) (1.698) (2.928) 
       
Role model treatment 1.891 1.297 1.886 −2.481 −6.478** −5.600 
 (2.520) (2.805) (5.928) (2.981) (2.672) (4.711) 
       
Historical placement info treatment 
(individual) 
−2.088 1.498 −2.837 −2.272 −2.273 5.261 
(3.429) (2.756) (4.154) (5.055) (2.481) (3.582) 
       
Some peers treated 0.119 3.870* 1.166 −1.200 −2.286 −0.792 
 (2.861) (2.118) (3.159) (2.810) (4.038) (2.549) 
       
Historical placement info treatment (block) × 
Covariate 
−0.416 −7.759* −1.444 4.495 −1.516 −3.991 
(3.858) (3.948) (4.176) (3.522) (7.078) (3.995) 
       
Role model treatment × Covariate −4.322 −7.278** −2.823 −9.201 −0.387 −2.144 
(3.752) (3.006) (6.441) (5.585) (5.730) (5.593) 
       
Historical placement info treatment 
(individual) × Covariate 
6.212 −0.155 4.921 −1.655 −7.616 −11.503** 
(5.117) (16.610) (5.047) (7.842) (9.300) (4.304) 
       
Some peers treated × Covariate 2.337 −12.565 0.163 −5.043 −5.137 −4.173 
 (4.722) (7.954) (4.256) (6.729) (9.168) (5.328) 
N 500 500 500 500 500 500 
Mean of D.V. −3.520 −3.520 −3.520 −3.736 −3.736 −3.736 
R2 0.067 0.071 0.064 0.098 0.088 0.096 
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Appendix B  Universities Included in the Sampling Frame 
 
Arizona State University University of California, Irvine 
California Institute of Technology University of California, Los Angeles 
Carnegie Mellon University University of California, Riverside 
Colorado State University University of California, San Diego 
Columbia University University of California, Santa Barbara 
Cornell University University of Chicago 
Duke University University of Colorado 
Emory University University of Delaware 
Georgia Institute of Technology University of Florida 
Harvard University University of Houston 
Indiana University University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign 
Iowa State University University of Maryland, College Park 
Johns Hopkins University University of Massachusetts Amherst 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology University of Michigan 
North Carolina State University University of Minnesota 
Northwestern University University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
Princeton University University of Pennsylvania 
Purdue University University of Pittsburgh 
Rice University University of South Florida 
Stanford University University of Southern California 
State University of New York at Buffalo University of Utah 
Texas A&M University University of Virginia 
The Ohio State University University of Washington 
The Pennsylvania State University University of Wisconsin-Madison 
The University of Texas at Austin Washington State University 
University of California, Berkeley Washington University in St. Louis 























NOTE: We visited websites of 56 U.S. chemistry research-intensive universities in search for the information they publish on their graduates’ placements. We looked through their 
graduate studies’ main pages, graduate student handbooks, career pages, alumni profiles, and news section. 
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Appendix D: Selected Survey Questions 
 
Measuring beliefs about the academic job market 
 
Q. What do you think is the percent chance (or chances out of 100) that you will eventually 
have a tenure-track position in a U.S. research-intensive university? 
 




 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 
 
How likely you will have a tenure-track 
position in the US? ()  
 
 
Q. Approximately what share of PhD graduates from your PhD program do you think 
eventually obtain a tenure-track position in a US research-intensive university? (0 means 
“None” and 100 means “All”). 
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Share of students with a tenure-track position 
in the US ()  
 
 
Measuring beliefs about postdoctoral training 
 
Q. What do you think is the percent chance (or chances out of 100) that you will do a 
postdoc after your PhD? 
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Measuring career preferences – counterfactual choice question 
 
Q. Now we want to ask you to do some simple evaluations of potential job offers. Imagine 
that you have just completed your dissertation and are looking for a full-time 
position.           
 
First, suppose you have the following job offers and you need to choose between them. 
Please rate how likely you are to accept one of them rather than the other.  For each job 
offer, choose the percent chance (out of 100) of choosing each one.  The total chances 
given to each offer should add up to 100.                      
 
_______ Job Offer #1: Research Scientist/Engineer at Private Sector Firm (e.g. DuPont, 
Novartis) Annual Salary: $90,000 (1) 
 
_______ Job Offer #2: Postdoctoral Research Fellow at Top U.S. university (e.g. 
Berkeley, MIT)  Annual Salary:  $50,000 (2) 
 
_______ Job Offer #3: Assistant Professor at top liberal arts college (e.g. Swarthmore 




















Academic faculty with an 
emphasis on research (1)  o  o  o  o  o  
Academic faculty with an 
emphasis on teaching (2)  o  o  o  o  o  
Government research and 
development position (3)  o  o  o  o  o  
Government (other) (6)  o  o  o  o  o  
Industry position with an 
emphasis on research and 
development (4)  o  o  o  o  o  








The objective of this data collection effort was to understand what share of PhD graduates from 
U.S. chemistry departments become faculty members themselves (in research-intensive 
universities), and differences across schools. To reach this objective, we collected data on students 
graduating from U.S. chemistry graduate programs between 2008 and 2010 and matched their 
names to a 2015 list of chemistry faculty in research-intensive universities. We then computed the 




The database “Proquest Dissertations and Abstracts” was used to obtain the list of chemistry 
dissertations completed between 2008 and 2010. Proquest Dissertations and Abstracts includes the 
names of students, the year and university of graduation as well as a subject classification for the 
thesis, among other information. While the database itself is generally thought to be quite 
comprehensive, it does not clearly indicate from which department the student graduated. This 
implies that one must deduce whether it was a chemistry dissertation from the subject classification. 
 
For lists of chemistry faculty, we relied on the ACS Directory of Graduate Research, available 
online at dgr.rints.com. This resource, meant to help prospective graduate students choose a 
graduate program, has an extensive listing of faculty members in U.S. PhD-granting chemistry, 
chemical engineering, and biochemistry programs. The ACS Directory of Graduate Research was 
used to create a list of faculty members in U.S. research-intensive universities, where research 
intensive is defined as “R1” or “R2” in the Carnegie classification. 
 
An important limitation is that it does not list faculty members outside the United States as well as 
in nonchemistry departments, where PhD chemistry graduates may find employment as university 




The list of graduate students was matched to the list of faculty using last names, initials, first names, 
year of graduation, and university of graduation. The matching algorithm is robust enough to 
handle cases of variations in spelling of first names, inconsistent reporting of middle names, or 
individuals changing last names. 
 
Limitations of the placement data 
 
The placement data presented here have a few important limitations. 
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First, some truncation bias arises from the fact that faculty placements are observed as of 2015, 
while the list of students include students who graduated relatively recently (say, 2010) and may 
have obtained a faculty position in 2016 or 2017, or may obtain a faculty position in the future. 
 
Second, the placement data fail to capture placement in nonchemistry departments that may employ 
chemistry PhD students, as well as placements outside the United States. 
 
Third, students outside chemistry departments may be mistakenly assigned to the chemistry 




Appendix F: Websites Linked in the Thank-You Emails  





American Chemical Society “Chemists in the Real World” website listing profiles of professional 





Appendix G: Web Analytics on Visits to the Website with Historical Placement Information 
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Not in the sample
Percentage of students who visited webpage
Share of survey respondents who visited webpage using sources
we could track
